This inkhorn term is most easily explained by reference to the changing times, to the de-domestication of time and reversion to open space. Take Baudrillard's watch and his observation on the "domestication" of time in relation to his observing (apperceiving) that "habit is discontinuity and repetition (and not, as common usage suggests, continuity)." He goes on to say,
The watch is a good example of this discontinual and 'habitual' function. It typifies the twofold way in which we experience objects. On the one hand [sic], it informs us about objective time - for chronometric exactitude is the very dimension of practical constraints, social exteriority, and death. But at the same time [sic] as it subjects us to an irreducible temporality, the watch as object also helps us to have time to ourselves. Just as a car 'eats up' the miles, so does the watch-object consume time. By concretising and dividing up time it turns it into an object of consumption. Time is no longer that hazardous dimension of praxis: it is a domesticated quantity. Not only has knowing the time become a staple diet or reassurance for civilised people, but also 'having' the time in an object of one's own, having it continually registered before one's eyes. Time is no longer in the home, in the ticking heart of a clock, but is always registered, in the watch, with the same physical satisfaction as intestinal regularity. Time reveals itself, through the watch, to be the very dimension of my objectification, and altogether to be a domestic product. Any object whatsoever would for that matter support this analysis of the recuperation of the very dimension of objective constraints: the watch, by its direct relation to time, is simply the clearest example of this.
[Jean Baudrillard, "Subjective Discourse or The Non-Functional System of Objects", in "Revenge of the Crystal", Pluto Press, 1990, p 50.
Fox observes that time has become once again, as it were, a "hazardous dimension of praxis", a 'place' to stumble upon after falling from the 3rd world of "meu/it" toward the 4th world, the cybennial world whereof Baudrillard's 'objective world' of reference is merely another novelty, a mere fictionalisation, fingering mind into perceptible shape. This is to move to Gurwitsch' world of marginal consciousness, but without the intervention of temporality in the experientation of object, and discarding (with difficulty) the 'conscious' distinguishing between experiencing of the object and 'awaring' of consciousness of it, ie being aware of experiencing (it). As Gurwitsch explains at the outset of his book "Marginal Consciousness",
When an object is given in experience, the experiencing subject is conscious of the object and has an awareness of this very consciousness of the object. Perceiving a material thing, listening to a musical note, thinking of a mathematical theorem, etc., but are also aware of our perceiving, listening, thinking, etc. Thus every act of consciousness is accompanied by an awareness of itself. When we experience an act which presents us with an object other than itself, i.e., an objectivating act, we are aware in being confronted with the object of our being so confronted, we are aware of our experiencing the act through which the object in question appears to consciousness.
Whatever its object, i.e., the proper or "primary" object or, in our terminology, the theme, the act always has a "secondary" object, which is the act itself. These are the terms in which the self-awareness of every conscious act has been formulated by Franz Brentano. Following Brentano, we contend that this inner awareness which we have of an act is not a subvenient act distinguished from the former. When an act, e.g., the representation of a note, is experienced, it is not as though a second were superinduced which would have the original act as its "primary" object. There is no supervenient, distinct, and separate representation of the representation of the note. The awareness of each conscious act is, rather, conveyed by this very act itself.
[Aron Gurwitsch, "Marginal Consciousness", Edited by Lester Embree, Ohio University Press, 1985, p3 --- note that Gurwitsch's "objectivating act" seems to refer to representational 'objects' (such as his example of an annotation of a musical note, when, of course, the annotation is an - intervening - object itself) being the means to being conscious of the objects they represent. His note intimates that all objects given in experience may be treated as such objectivisations.]
However, this seems to lead to the 'consciousness-of-the-experience-of-the-object' being 'in' the object itself. However, while this doesn't do Gurwitsch's case much good, it certainly collaborates unwittingly with Fox's "meu/it".
Putting to sea in a
To sail the unfathomable sea
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