Albert Monstone is looking at, into, around the fundamental issue of human corporeality, which in 1964 seemed corporeally human, did it not? It certainly did; but not now, 2000. No, now we are looking at something with quite different possibilities, possibilities that far exceed Kant's limitations (of, say, noumenal proportions). Now we are looking at human corporeality disappearing from the sight scale of present human perception &/or conception.
If we recall the function that had to be attributed to the lived body for the constitution of space per se, then the result for us is that the question of the existence of mathematical spaces - as an ontological question concerning the mode of their being - will not be answered merely in relationship to some finite being or other. Rather, it must be answered more concretely and fundamentally from the mathematizing process of a corporeal human being who is designed in this and no other way. It is first of all "on the basis"
Elisabeth Stroeker, 'Investigations in Philosophy of Space', Translated by Algis Mickunas, from Stroeker 1964, (Ohio University Press, 1987), pp306-307.
The emphasis is not mine, but Stroeker's. Her fundamental of the, as it were, known corporeality of humankind, is here &/or now very much in contention. Is it not a corporeity, soon to contend with itself in its forms of other (corporeities), contending for survival (a corner of a universe) or (dominance of The Universe) through the control of critical resources, or resources critical to IT? Such resources as are the limitation of living room in space, peculiar to a corporeality's definition.
By the way, Stroeker's book is a lovely work of true value, it will keep you engaged over and over, whenever you've time to spare for it.